Post by RS Davis on Mar 12, 2004 16:00:17 GMT -5
[glow=red,2,300]Charles V. Peña Wrote:[/glow]Delegates from more than 20 countries met in Bali recently to discuss advancing international cooperation in the ongoing war on terrorism. Indonesia and Australia, co-hosts of the meeting, proposed a transnational crime center, an anti-terrorist training center in Jakarta, and the strengthening of a forensic laboratory center. Yet in his State of the Union speech, President Bush said that he did not view terrorism as a crime or "a problem to be solved ... with law enforcement." At the same time, however, he called for renewing the Patriot Act: "If these methods are good for hunting criminals, they are more important for hunting terrorists." He then seemed to contradict himself again when he told the U.S. military: "We will give you the resources you need to fight and win the war on terrorism."
These seemingly schizophrenic remarks underscore that the war on terrorism is not well understood. But if understanding is lost on us, what does this mean for the ways we wage the war on terrorism and our prospects for success?
Part of the problem is the name of the campaign: a "war on terrorism." War implies the use of military force. Yet force will be the exception, rather than the rule, for fighting the war on terrorism. To be sure, military action was needed in Afghanistan to depose the Taliban regime that supported al Qaeda. But al Qaeda operatives are dispersed throughout 60 (or more) countries, and most, if not all, of those countries are not willing hosts -- so regime change will not be an appropriate course of action. Instead, intelligence sharing and cooperative law enforcement (perhaps sometimes with the assistance of military or para-military forces) will be the hallmarks of how a successful drive to round up al Qaeda operatives and dismantle their cells.
Indeed, this is how the Hamburg, Germany, cell -- allegedly involved in planning the 9/11 attacks -- was discovered, and how Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a mastermind behind 9/11, and Hambali, a key player in the Bali Marriott attack, were captured.
These seemingly schizophrenic remarks underscore that the war on terrorism is not well understood. But if understanding is lost on us, what does this mean for the ways we wage the war on terrorism and our prospects for success?
Part of the problem is the name of the campaign: a "war on terrorism." War implies the use of military force. Yet force will be the exception, rather than the rule, for fighting the war on terrorism. To be sure, military action was needed in Afghanistan to depose the Taliban regime that supported al Qaeda. But al Qaeda operatives are dispersed throughout 60 (or more) countries, and most, if not all, of those countries are not willing hosts -- so regime change will not be an appropriate course of action. Instead, intelligence sharing and cooperative law enforcement (perhaps sometimes with the assistance of military or para-military forces) will be the hallmarks of how a successful drive to round up al Qaeda operatives and dismantle their cells.
Indeed, this is how the Hamburg, Germany, cell -- allegedly involved in planning the 9/11 attacks -- was discovered, and how Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a mastermind behind 9/11, and Hambali, a key player in the Bali Marriott attack, were captured.
- Rick
For further information, read James Bovard's Terrorism and Tyranny.
